Pour Monsieur Jean Jolivet, modeste signe de mon respect et de mon amitié.
In the conclusion of his masterly overview of the Arabic heritage of twelfth-century Latin philosophy, Jean Jolivet asks : Is it possible to estimate exactly the significance and historical importance of this irruption of Arabic philosophy into the Christian West ? Was this integration to the advantage of Greco-Arabic synthesis or of the Christian ideas which had been integrated into it ? Jolivet cautiously challenges Gilsons view that the Scholastics christianized the philosophical doctrines they received.
2 Analogous questions have naturally been raised about Judaisms reception of medieval philosophy, first and foremost with regard to the Maimonidean synthesis. Here I shall examine this problem from another and rather narrow angle ; namely, the special case of an erudite twelfth-century Provençal commentator on the Talmud, one of the very first to have had access to (the handful of then existing) philosophical texts in Hebrew. He accommodated some philosophical notions by using them creatively for his own exegetical needs, but he did not make any original contribution to philosophy and is not mentioned in any history of philosophy. Nevertheless, he illustrates how philosophical ideas enriched the distinctively traditional religious discourse of talmudic exegesis. In this admittedly atypical instance we may definitely say that the Greco-Arabic heritage was thoroughly Judaized. To be sure this is a far cry from the Maimonidean enterprise, which accorded philosophy a far greater weight in the encounter with the Jewish tradition. Although the text to be studied here is relatively marginal in the history of Jewish thought, it does have some significance as evidence concerning an early phase of the reception and Judaization of philosophical ideas by Jewish scholars in twelfth-century Provence.
Introduction : The First Accommodation of Greek-Arabic Learning in Hebrew
Jews intellectual activity has traditionally focused on the study of the canonical texts notably the Talmud sanctified and legitimized through its own tradition. Intellectual pursuits that originated in other cultures notably science and philosophy were more often than not perceived and rejected as alien (sometimes : Greek) wisdom. Although the Talmud itself includes some statements that legitimize the study of alien wisdom, pre-modern Jewish cultures tended to be self-sufficient ; the most prevalent attitude toward such knowledge was one of circumspection if not downright hostility. 3 The following quotation from the erudite and prestigious talmudist R. Asher ben Ye¹iel (Rosh), who first encountered science and philosophy when, early in the fourteenth century, he fled from Germany to Spain, reflects a long-standing mainstream attitude within Judaism :
Philosophical knowledge and Torah knowledge are not on a par. The Torah was given to Moses at Mount Sinai, but philosophy is a natural science. It was [therefore] inevitable that the philosophers would deny the Torah : for the Torah is not a natural science, but rather [a science] received and transmitted by tradition [qabbalah] . [The Torah and philosophy] are contraries, two rival wives who cannot exist in one and the same place. 4 Judaism assumed an unbroken line of transmission and reception (qabbalah) linking the present to the revelation vouchsafed to Moses. It legitimized traditional knowledge while repelling competing bodies of belief. In view of this, the strikingly rapid accommodation of nontraditional and especially philosophical texts in various places during the Middle Ages seems almost to run against nature and calls for explanation.
The facts themselves are well-known. Between the early tenth and the fifteenth centuries, major segments of the Jewish communities integrated significant elements of Greco-Arabic philosophy and science into their world-views. The process took place in two stages, which overlap somewhat. It began in the Islamic lands, where Jews were acculturated to a considerable degree. They spoke, read, and wrote the language of the majority culture and thus gained direct access to it. In Baghdad, Saadia Gaon (882942) was the first influential Rabbanite thinker to compose (in Arabic) philosophical works aimed at demonstrating that there is no incompatibility between Moses revealed law and the results of rational philosophical investigation. Many other authors, in both East and West (notably Spain), followed suit. The process reached its peak with R. Moses ben Maimon, Maimonides (1137/81204), whose Guide of the Perplexed created a lasting and influential platform for a synthesis of Judaism and Greco-Arabic philosophy.
The second stage of the process took place in southern Europe, where, over a period of two and a half centuries beginning in the first half of the twelfth century, Arabophone Jewish scholars encyclopedists, translators, and philosophers transferred a sizable portion of the corpus of Greco-Arabic philosophy and science into Hebrew, making it available to their coreligionists who could not read Arabic or Latin. This process can usefully be divided into three phases. (1) The process of transmission began in the early twelfth century, when scholars in northern Spain (notably Abraham bar ¸iyya) wrote scientific works in Hebrew for the Jews living north of the Pyrenees. (2) It gathered momentum, toward the middle of the century, when Andalusian Jewish scholars immersed in Arabic culture came to Provence and Italy, considerably enhancing the dissemination of philosophical lore in Hebrew. (3) It received a new and decisive impetus when, in the first decades of the thirteenth century, Maimonides writings, notably the Hebrew translation of the Guide of the Perplexed (1204), became influential in Southern Europe. This period of intensive translation lasted until about the middle of the fourteenth century. During these two centuries scores of works were translated from Arabic into Hebrew, in an unprecedented large-scale appropriation of alien wisdom by Jewish communities previously devoted entirely to traditional learning.
In recent and less recent works I have described some aspects of this process of cultural transfer and offered historical and sociological accounts thereof.
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Especially interesting is the very first period of the Arabic-to-Hebrew translations, executed in the Midi from the 1150s until the end of the century. 6 It is well-known that this process was set in motion when two scholarly Jewish families, fleeing the Almohad persecutions, settled in Provence during the early 1150s the Ibn Tibbons in Lunel and the Qim¹is in Narbonne. The culture they brought with them was altogether different from that of their coreligionists in their new communities. Whereas the latter were still all absorbed in traditional talmudic learning, the immigrants were at home in Arabic poetry, literature, grammar, philosophy, and science. 7 The remarkable fact is that within a few decades they succeeded in acculturating a sizeable portion of the Provençal Jewish intellectual elite to their own, philosophically informed mode of thought. Unlike the situation in Islamic lands a few centuries earlier, the acculturation of Provençal Jews did not proceed by direct reception from the majority culture (whose language Latin was alien to almost all Jewish scholars), but rather through translations (from the Arabic).
Judah Ibn Tibbon (c. 1120-1190), who founded a dynasty of translators that persisted for about a century and a half and who came to be called the Father of the Translators, came to Lunel from Granada. In Lunel he found a potent patron in the person of R. Meshullam ben Jacob, the wealthy head of the local yeshiva (d. 1170), and his son R. Asher ben Meshullam, who became his close friend and is the focus of the present paper. R. Meshullams personality and his role as patron of the translation movement have often been described. The close collaboration between Judah Ibn Tibbon and his patrons resulted the Hebrew versions of such classic of Judeo-Arabic thought as Ba¹yah Ibn Paqudahs Duties of the Hearts (first part 1161), Solomon Ibn Gabirols The Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul (1161), Judah ha-Levis Kuzari (1167), Saadia Gaons Beliefs and Opinions (1186), and some works of grammar. These are justly considered to be the foundational works of Jewish philosophy and are discussed in every history of medieval Jewish thought.
Here I wish to look at an early, very minor but (I believe) interesting instance of the reception of philosophical ideas in Provence during the second half of the twelfth century. I shall examine the mark left by philosophy in the writings of R. Asher b. Meshullam, as exemplifying an aspect that often goes unnoticed by historians of philosophy : the impact of philosophical ideas on Jewish scholars who, because they remained devoted to the exclusive study of the Jewish canonical text, the Talmud, did not compose philosophical texts and have not found a place in the annals of Jewish philosophy.
Rabbi Asher b. Meshullam
The figure of R. Asher (d. after 1193), a student of R. Zera¹iah (the author of Sefer ha-Maor and one of the greatest talmudic lights in the Midi of those decades), has recently been the object of insightful studies by the late Israel M. Ta-Shma.
8 R. canonical texts and the authority of trustworthy transmission, R. Asher held that Jewish thought must also integrate the fruits of philosophical-rationalist inquiry, i.e., alien sources of knowledge. He explicitly stated that knowledge derives from three sources : tradition (qabbalah), writ (katuv), and reason (sekhel), 11 a clear indication that he had internalized the notion that Judaism should feel committed (also) to knowledge whose fountainhead is external to Judaism, viz. in philosophy. It is not surprising that R. Asher was among the very first intellectuals in Provence who was acquainted with philosophical ideas. As noted above, together with his father R. Meshullam he was a patron of Judah Ibn Tibbon and his close friend as well. Moreover, he attended sessions at which the latter read i.e. taught his translations to a group of scholars under the direction of R. Meshullam. 12 We thus know with certainty that he picked up some philosophical knowledge through oral communication with the major translator of philosophical texts of the day. It seems natural to suppose that R. Asher had access to Judah Ibn Tibbons translations, too a surmise that our analysis of his philosophical vocabulary and ideas will substantiate. We shall also see that R. Asher was selective in his attitude toward philosophy and took over only a few of the ideas he encountered in Judah Ibn Tibbons translations.
The passage from the commentary on Berakhot is the only extended published text by R. Asher with a bearing on philosophy.
13 It can be dated fairly precisely and was presumably written in the decade after 1186 (see Conclusion) . In what follows I present an annotated English translation of this passage, which, as will be seen, reveals a Neoplatonic tendency and is in keeping with its authors ascetic tendencies. The philosophy has been skillfully woven into the talmudic commentary, making this text an instance of a thorough Judaization of philosophical ideas in which no trace of tension between the two sources of knowledge is discernable.
In fact, R. Asher integrated whatever he chose to accommodate from philosophy into his text so well that two later and rather traditionalist authors borrowed it almost to the point of plagiarism :
Moshe Idel discovered that passages from R. Ashers text are embedded in the homilies of R. Ba¹ya ben Ashers Kad ha-Qema¹ (end of the thirteenth century). 14 11. Simha Assaf, Gaonica. Gaonic Responsa and Fragments of Halachic Literature from the Geniza and other sources (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1933) In addition, the relatively unknown scholar Jacob b. ¸ananel Sikily appropriated R. Ashers text and ideas, even more extensively, making them into the backbone of one of the sermons included in his voluminous Torat ha-min¹ah (completed 1337).
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Both authors (neither mentions R. Asher by name) use our text for their own purposes, paraphrasing, amending, abridging, and interpolating freely, in accordance with their own intellectual outlooks and objectives. For our purposes their texts are valuable as additional testimonia, which, although they must be used with circumspection, occasionally allow us to improve R. Ashers text.
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R. Asher b. Meshullams Commentary on Tractate Berakhot
The text to be studied here is an excerpt, preserved by a later author, of R. Ashers commentary on Tractate Berakhot of the Babylonian Talmud (=BT). To understand R. Ashers text, it is important to bear in mind that a talmudic passage generally consists of a number of superposed textual strata, corresponding to different layers of the Jewish canonic corpus. This corpus can be schematically described as follows :
Level 1 : The 24 books of the Tanakh (= Hebrew Bible, Old Testament).
Level 2 : The 66 tractates of the Mishnah (completed c. 200 CE), which is entirely in Hebrew, record some three centuries of traditions and deliberations of the Sages or tannaim. Their interpretative activity proceeded on the principle that Moses received from God not only the Written Law, but also an Oral Law, which was handed down by a reliable and uninterrupted tradition. In as much as these texts often quote and comment on biblical verses, they are two-tier texts.
Level 3 : Further discussions of the Sages are recorded in the two Talmuds : in the less influential Jerusalem Talmud, completed ca. 365 CE, in Palestine ; and in the authoritative Babylonian Talmud, completed in Mesopotamia ca. 500. Each section consists of a mishnah (in Hebrew) and an extended discussion thereof (mostly in Aramaic), called gemara. These are thus three-tier texts (at least).
15. Jacob Sikily, Torat ha-min¹ah, ed. Barukh Avigdor ¸efe (Heifetz) (Safed, 1991 ; repr. : Jerusalem, 2000 Levels 4® ¥: A central commandment of Jewish law makes the continuous study of the canonic texts a religious obligation. This turns the study and interpretation of the Talmud, taken to be an inexhaustible treasure of divine truth, into an end in itself. Consequently, Jewish intellectual life traditionally focused on hermeneutical activity centered around the Babylonian Talmud, the Jewish canonic text par excellence. It has been an essentially autonomous and closed intellectual activity. Because these commentaries quote talmudic passages, including multi-layered passages, they are four-tier texts (at least).
The text by R. Asher presented here comes from his commentary on a talmudic passage that quotes and comments on several verses from Psalms 103 and 104. It therefore contains all these layers : (1) verses from Psalms ; (2) two passages of the BT, Tractate Berakhot, in which rabbis discuss these verses ; and (3) R. Ashers own comments on the biblical verses and on the talmudic passages. To appreciate his argument, we need to distinguish these layers : I therefore reproduce below the relevant verses of the [IV] He saw the downfall of the wicked and broke into song, as it says, Let sinners cease out of the earth and let the wicked be no more. (ii) Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, sees, but is not seen, so the soul sees but is not itself seen. (iii) Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, nourishes the whole world, so too the soul nourishes the whole body. (iv) Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, is pure, so the soul is pure. (v) Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, abides in the innermost chambers, so the soul abides in the innermost chambers. Let that which has these five qualities come and praise Him who has these qualities. 29 This is 26. In the Hebrew philosophical literature, the terms small world and great world usually refer to the notions of microcosm and macrocosm in the philosophical sense, implying notably the idea that the microcosm, man, mirrors the macrocosm, i.e. the entire universe. R. Ashers terminological usage clearly betrays familiarity with this notion (see Conclusion), but he does not espouse it and uses the terms to express his own thought. I therefore chose to avoid the usage of the terms microcosm and macrocosm.
27. This sentence, including the terminology, reflects R. Ashers familiarity with the basic principles of astrology. Jewish scholars in the Midi were introduced to this discipline through Abraham Ibn Ezra who, during his sojourn there (ca. 1148-1153), composed a Hebrew astrological encyclopedia based on Arabic sources. Ibn Ezra diffused his astrological ideas also via his numerous and very influential biblical commentaries. See Shlomo Sela, Abraham Ibn Ezra and the Rise of Medieval Hebrew Science (Leiden : Brill, 2003) . A passage from a text by R. Asher on the powers of the planets has been discovered and published by the late I. Ta-Shma ; see his Qiur Sefer ¸ovot ha-levavot le-R. Asher b. R. Shelamya mi-Lunel, Aley sefer 10 (1982), 13-24, on pp. 23-24. Jewish intellectuals were much preoccupied with the theological consequences of astrology, especially with respect to the freedom of will, reward and punishment, and the value of prayer.
28. To neutralize the potential dangerous theological implications of astrology, the argument was often adduced that the power of the planets derived from God and that the planets act by His command. See, e.g., Abraham Ibn Ezra on Deut. 8:3 and Dan. 7:4 (both refer to a force emanating from the upper bodies by order of the Lord). Similarly, in Solomon Ibn Gabirols poem Crown of Royalty, the description of each planets actions on the sublunar world is repeatedly followed by a remark to the effect that it acts by the Will of its Creator. On the term olam shafel see the Conclusion.
29. The existents that bring forth things are the planets, which in turn have themselves been brought forth by God. Thus all existents, even those that may seem to have been produced by the planets, are all His handiwork and He governs them all. [v] He looked upon the day of death. This means that the souls of the righteous are preserved under the Throne of Glory (BT Shabbat 152b), so that for them death is life.
35 This is why [David] placed his song in immediate 30 . The notions that mans finality is to know God and that knowing God presupposes studying wisdom i.e. philosophy is distinctively philosophical and new to talmudic thought. It is of course paramount in later Jewish philosophical literature notably in Maimonides Guide (whence, beginning in the thirteenth century, it diffused also to some traditional literature) but it is exceptional in a talmudic commentary of the twelfth century. R. Asher was probably inspired by Saadyahs Beliefs and Opinions 10:11, but may have come across the idea elsewhere, too (e.g., Ibn Ezras Commentary on Hos. 6:3).
31. R. Asher understands the talmudic phrase as confirming his own view of the prime importance of wisdom whose finality is the knowledge of God. Even human anatomy is subordinated to this end.
32. For an explication of this notion see the Conclusion. 33. As printed, R. Ashers text has maalatan [= dignity] instead of mapaltan [= downfall] as it (logically) reads in the Talmud, a fairly amusing (Freudian ?) lapsus by R. Asher, a scribe, or the modern editor.
34. I will try to explicate this notion in the Conclusion. 35. Cf. BT Berakhot 18a. This is an allusion to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul of the righteous, elaborated in some detail below. proximity to Thou art great indeed (Ps 104:1) rather than to Thou hidest Thy face, and they are restless and troubled (Ps 104:29 40. This statement is a partly verbatim quotation from Abraham Ibn Ezras Long Commentary on Exodus 25:40. Ibn Ezra says that although Gods Glory fills the entire world, we yet know that there are places in which the Lords power is more apparent than elsewhere ; but he does not mention the places listed by R. Asher. See also n. 44 below.
41. As pointed out before, this statement signals the recognition of the rationalist-philosophic mode of inquiry as a legitimate source of knowledge. The triad of intellect, Scripture, and Tradition (the latter is not mentioned here) is paramount in the Judeo-Arabic literature translated by Judah Ibn Tibbon and appears, e.g., in the Introduction to Ba¹yah Ibn Paqudahs Duties of the Heart (Idel, Qea, 152, n. 22 Idel, Qea, p. 150, n. 12) , but with telling differences. Ibn Ezra mentions the eyes and the ears, explaining that they are sensitive because they contain nerves (strings issuing from the brain), unlike, e.g., the bones. R. Asher presumably did not understand this biological information and instead named the brain, the tongue, and the heart, i.e., the body parts that, from his ascetic-religious perspective, he took to be involved in the manifestations of soul.
45. The use of the concept irrational animals and of the corresponding Hebrew term clearly reflects familiarity with the recent Hebrew philosophic corpus translated by Judah Ibn Tibbon. See below in the Conclusion.
46. Read be-maasey instead of ke-maasey. 47. Following the variant reading in Idel, Sarid, p. 85, n. 58. 48. The verb r..h (= to see) is here interpreted as having a metaphorical rather than literal meaning, referring to intellectual rather than sensory apprehension. The question arises whether R. Asher devised it himself or derived it from some earlier writing. To be sure, much the same the argument adduced here was employed by Maimonides to avert anthropomorphism : Maimonides in fact cites the same verse as R. Asher and comments that its refers to intellectual apprehension (Guide 1:4). Despite this similarity in their knows all things inasmuch as they are all His handiwork, but is not known in and of Himself, although He fills the entire world, 49 but only through His actions [raq mi-ad peulotaw] 50 : this is so because, being incorporeal, He cannot be perceived by the senses but can only be apprehended by the intellect. Just so, the soul [neshamah] knows all things, lower and upper, nearby and far away, until its knowledge reaches the First Cause [ha-sibbah ha-rishonah] 51 ; and although it fills the entire body, yet, being incorporeal, it is not known in and of itself, but only through its actions. The spirit [nefesh] of the animal, by contrast, does not truly know anything, and comes close to being known in and of itself, because it is a body, subtle like the body of the air, and accordingly descends down to the earth respective hermeneutical strategies, the fact that R. Asher does not employ any of the terms used in Maimonides works (both the Book of Knowledge and the Hebrew translation of the Guide) seems to exclude the possibility that he was familiar with any of them when he wrote this text (see Conclusion). Is then the idea that to see refers to knowing and its grounding in Eccl. 1:16 R. Ashers own innovation ? While this is not impossible, it seems more likely that the talmudic scholar adopted it from some Hebrew source that originated in Judeo-Arabic culture. One such source could be a gaonic responsum variously ascribed to R. ¸ay Gaon and R. ¸ananel, whose point is to avert anthropomorphism. Referring to prophetic visions of God, the author writes : Since we know that He appears to the prophets in such a way [that they perceive an image], it transpires that the said vision is a vision of the heart, not a vision of the eye, for it is impossible to say that Gods image is seen, when seeing is understood as referring to the vision of the eye. Rather it is a vision in the heart as in the verse my heart saw much wisdom and knowledge (Eccl. 1:16). See David Metzger (ed.), Perushey Rabbenu ¸ananel bar ¸ushiel la-Talmud : Masekhet Berakhot (Jerusalem : Makhon Lev Samea¹, 1990), pp. 10-11. Now R. Ashers view is not identical with that of the Gaon : the latter refers to a sort of interior vision in the heart during which the prophet is under the impression that he indeed sees God, whereas R. Asher is closer to Maimonides in identifying seeing with knowledge. Still, it seems possible that his use of the verse from Ecclesiastes was inspired by the gaonic text. Indeed, the latter is included in an important collection of responsa that was known in Provence in R. Ashers time and that, according to some scholars, may even have been edited by none other than R. It should be added that the soul really [can] nourish the body and can sustain the body with very little or no food for many days. This happens when the souls power [koa¹] exerts itself until it receives the supernal power [koa¹ ha-elyon]. Moses and Elijah provide proof thereof. For our Master Moses (blessed be his memory) stood without food or drink for a number of days equal to the number of his years, 55 but nevertheless increased in great power and awesome light, because of the power he received from the World of Wisdom and because he benefited from the Splendor of the Shekhinah. The same applies to Elijah on earth, who walked a long distance during 52. R. Ashers phrasing follows Eccles. 3:21. This distinction between mans soul and the beasts spirit goes back to a tradition expounding the difference between the biological animal spirit, which, however subtle, is yet material, and the rational soul, which is immaterial. This is why I have rendered the animals nefesh and human neshamah as spirit and soul, respectively. R. Asher may have come across this idea in Abraham Ibn Ezras commentary on Ecclesiastes (3:20-21 ; 7:3). R. Asher follows Ibn Ezra also in his use of neshamah exclusively for the human rational soul and nefesh for the vital souls of animals ; see, in addition to the above, Ibn Ezras commentary on Gen. 57. This passage is significant in that it provides the philosophic and scientific grounding for R. Ashers ascetic practices : when he was aloof of the business of this world, and fasting and not eating meat (above, p. 159), R. Asher assumed that his soul would really sustain his body and he was trying to receive power from the World of Wisdom. R. Asher may have got the idea from Saadyah Gaon, who, in his Beliefs and Opinions (Treatise 8), adduced a very similar argument. To make plausible the idea that after the Resurrection of the dead human beings will be able to subsist without food, he says that Moses lived thrice 40 days without nourishment, namely by virtue of a light that God created for him and which illuminated his face.
58. The place of the last world in the sequence of the three worlds shows that R. Asher must refer to some notion of what is usually known as the world of generation and corruption. I discuss the specific ideas he associates with this notion in the Conclusion.
59. See n. 62 below. 60. The translation integrates the omission indicated in Idel, Sarid, p. 87, n. 81. It is confirmed by the text in Sikily, Torat ha-min¹ah, p. 558.
61. Read kakh instead of akh. 62. The notion that God sustains the world was at the core of immanentist conceptions of the deity, many versions of which were maintained by medieval Jewish thinkers in both the rationalist and the mystical traditions ; they were all confronted with the issue of the deitys contact with vile matter. See Joseph Dan, The Esoteric Theology of Ashkenazi Hasidism (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1968 66. I.e., the soul cannot be known without searching through the chambers of Wisdom.
67. On the origin of this terminology see the Conclusion. 68. The notion of the Sphere of Intellect is also to be found in Ibn Gabirols poem and elsewhere ; see Idel, Qea, pp. 152-153. The notion of the soul as consisting of a spiritual substance originating from its abode and longing to return there (above, p. 170) is distinctively Neoplatonic.
69. The extant fragment of R. Ashers commentary continues for a few further lines, but they are unrelated to the previous discussions (see n. 17) and hence not germane to the present study.
Conclusion : R. Asher b. Meshullam and Philosophy
R. Ashers Terminology and Concepts : The Imprint of Judah Ibn Tibbons Translations
Moshe Idel has already noted that R. Asher derived a number of his ideas from Abraham Ibn Ezra. Some further points of contact have been pointed out above in the notes and need not be repeated here, where I limit myself to noting the following pair of terminological borrowings :
Mesharetim, literally servants, denotes the five planets, excluding the two great luminaries. The term is ubiquitous in Ibn Ezras writings, both exegetical and scientific, but is not used by Judah Ibn Tibbon, which allows us to infer that R. Asher learned it from Ibn Ezra. R. Asher used all these terms roughly in their philosophical signification, although he avoids philosophical discussions. No less interesting, however, are the terms that R. Asher either modified or coined himself. In some cases it can be shown how he fashioned them from Ibn Tibbons philosophical lexicon in accordance with his own specific views and aims. Consider the following :
Olam qaan and olam gadol (=small world and great world). These terms are found in a number of Judah Ibn Tibbons translations (e.g. Kuzari [4:3, 4:25] , Duties of the Hearts [2:4], and Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul [Introduction]), where they denote the well-known notions of microcosm and macrocosm, respectively. All these texts express the idea of a correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm, an idea very different from that stated by R. Asher. Apparently he deliberately chose to use the philosophical terms for his own purposes : the identification of the womb as a small world is not otherwise known. seems unlikely that R. Asher borrowed the term from him. 75 The peculiar and apparently unprecedented term olam ha-mahapekhah we-ha-temurah seems to reflect R. Ashers predilection for the human side of existence notably justice over cosmology : he decided (I submit) to replace world of generation and corruption with a term that alludes not to the regular and balanced changes of natural phenomena, but rather to the turmoil and inconstancy of human destiny in the lower world. Inspired by Judah Ibn Tibbons works he used a substantive that he believed would better reflect his meaning.
76
Olam ha-mishpa we-haedeq (= the World of Judgment and Justice). This term, too, is not known from elsewhere. It seems to me that R. Asher coined it from the term olam ha-gemul, which appears in Judah Ibn Tibbons translation of Saadyah Gaons Beliefs and Opinions as a synonym for what Saadyah calls the World to Come, in which God will repay (g.m.l.) each person according to his or her deeds.
77 R. Asher may have replaced ha-gemul with the equivalent ha-mishpa we-ha-edeq because the verb g.m.l. repay can connote both reward and punishment ; 78 in a context where it was important to convey only the positive meaning he deemed it better to use the unequivocal and better-known mishpa wa-edeq, found in the Bible (Ps. 119:121 ; Eccles. 5:7 ; see also Ps. 89:15 and 97:2 ; Prov. 1:3 and 2:9).
79 Another consideration may have been that the hendiadys made this expression more rhetorically effective. We will see that, unlike Saadyahs olam ha-gemul, R. Ashers fourth world is an eschatological inner-worldly (rather than transcendent) notion, referring to a state of the world to be brought about by God in the future, although R. Asher puts the emphasis on mans spiritual progress, not on the future state of the world as such (see below). Olam ha-menu¹ah (= the World of Repose). Although not strictly philosophical, this term too was adapted from Judah Ibn Tibbon. It is found in his translations of Duties of the Hearts (3:3), where it is identified with the World to Come (see also 8:3 [25] : meqom ha-menu¹ah [= the place of repose]), and of the Kuzari (5 :10), where it is identified with the 75. R. Asher seems not to use any other term of Bar ¸iyya and evinces no familiarity with any of his ideas.
76. Similarly and out of similar considerations, Ba¹yah ben Asher refers to this world as olam ha-aar we-ha-mehumah (= the world of sorrow and tumult). See Kitvey Rabbenu Ba¹yah, p. 57.
77. Beliefs and Opinions, Treatises 5 and 7 ; also in Abraham Ibn Ezras Commentary on Eccl. 9:8.
78. See, e.g., the contemporary (1161) lexicon by Solomon Par¹on, Ma¹beret he-arukh, ed. Salomon Gottlieb Stern (Pressburg, 1844), f. 13a. 79. See Idel, Qea, p. 80. world of the angels (i.e., of the separate intellects), in which the soul attains repose. 80 R. Ashers lexical choice may have been inspired by the rabbinic saying that the souls of the Righteous are under the Throne of Glory, whereas the soul of the wicked wanders in the world and finds no repose [we-ein lah menu¹ah], which is quoted by Saadyah Gaon (Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise 6, in fine).
81 It is clearly intended as the counterpoise of the world of turmoil and change.
R. Asher, we see, borrowed a number of terms from the new non-talmudic Hebrew literature of his time. He clearly was familiar with at least some of it : most if not all of Judah Ibn Tibbons Hebrew translations of Judeo-Arabic works, and works by Abraham Ibn Ezra. The certainty that he was acquainted with these writings allows us to continue another step forward and conclude that where he uses terms that parallel established terms but are distinct from them he did so deliberately : this is clearest with World of turmoil and change, but applies equally to World of Judgment and Justice and World of Repose. Far from being a passive recipient of philosophical knowledge, R. Asher adopted what he found in the philosophical writings and adapted it to suit his own needs and purposes.
R. Ashers Five Worlds
The most intriguing idea in R. Ashers text is that of the different worlds. In text III A R. Asher lists five worlds, for which, as M. Idel noted, 82 there is no earlier known source :
1. The small world, identified with the womb, with the rationale that investigation begins at the beginning of coming-to-be. 2. The great world, identified with the world of the spheres ; it is associated with the perception that human beings receive power from the stars when they are born. 3. The World of Wisdom, associated with mans unique capacity to acquire knowledge allowing him to know God. It is also the world from which It seems quite clear that the three worlds of III B correspond (in reverse order) to the first three of III A : 1=c ; 2=b ; and 3=a. These are (roughly) the classic worlds of medieval cosmology, although their designations here are somewhat different from those usual in philosophical literature. This identification must be qualified, however. The subject of III A is mans spiritual development, and R. Asher mentions the three first worlds only because and inasmuch they are the first three objects of mans knowledge (more on this below). By contrast, in III B R. Asher is dealing not with intellectual development, but with cosmology ; hence his list includes only the three cosmological worlds. This should be borne in mind when we now consider the various worlds in turn.
According to R. Asher, the first step in acquiring wisdom is the inquiry into the three cosmological worlds : the sublunar material world, the supralunar material world, and the world of the separate intellects. 83 The topological arrangement, from lowest to highest, is at the same time an ontological ordering (by nobility) : the celestial realm rules over the mundane realm and the World of Wisdom (= Intellect) is above them all (III A in fine). This is also the temporal order of mans apprenticeship as construed by R. Asher. This would seem to be the original core of R. Ashers doctrine : he creatively identified the three first worlds of talmudic passage II A the womb, the celestial realm (constellations), and wisdom with the three worlds of philosophy. The philosophical notion that the World of Intellect (=Wisdom) is the abode of the human soul, to which it returns after death, felicitously allowed him to identify it with the Throne of Glory, under which (according to the aggadic passage in BT Shabbat 152b) the souls of the Righteous are preserved.
84
To complete his exegesis, R. Asher now had to account for the two remaining worlds alluded to in the talmudic passage, which have no obvious parallel in philosophy. To pursue his interpretation consistently, he needed to construe them as the last two steps in mans spiritual development, which (according to the talmudic passage) are related to the fate of the wicked and to death. R. Asher thus identified the next (fourth) step in mans spiritual progress with witnessing the eventual downfall of the wicked, when God brings it about. Note that this refers explicitly to a future occurrence that will take place in this world ; i.e., it is not related to the fate of the soul after death. (As noted, this is at variance with Saadyahs notion, which presumably was R. Ashers point of departure.) R. Asher refers to this fourth step in mans spiritual development as the World of Judgment and Justice. The fifth and last step in the acquisition of wisdom consists in looking at what happens after death : man discovers that the souls of the righteous are not extinguished ; rather, they are preserved eternally, under the Throne of Glory, i.e., in the Sphere of Intellect. This entails the consequence that, for the righteous, death is [eternal] life. R. Asher refers to this as the World of the Souls and the World of Repose.
The names of the last two worlds are misleading, however, and, moreover, the statements concerning the World of the Souls and the World of Repose seem to be at variance with the idea that the souls emanate from, and (after death) return to, the Sphere of Intellect or the Throne of Glory (= the third world). In fact, there is no inconsistency between the two notions. R. Ashers fifth world is the fifth and ultimate level of cognition and has nothing to do with where the souls of the righteous are before and after their sojourn in the lower world. The seeming contradiction results from the imprecise use of language. When R. Asher discussed the three first worlds, he used their names to refer equivocally both to the worlds themselves as posited in philosophy and to the knowledge man acquired of them, and this ambiguity worked nicely. When he now extends this scheme to the last two worlds of the talmudic passage, he introduces the appellations World of Judgment and Justice and World of the Souls and the World of Repose, a terminology that is misleading inasmuch as it suggests two worlds that exist in the same sense as the cosmological ones, whereas they designate two steps in mans intellectual progress.
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The central thread of the entire interpretation is thus the desire to identify the five steps of mans intellectual-spiritual progress, described in the talmudic passage, with the ascent from one world to the next. This comes to the fore in particular in R. Ashers statement that the tanna followed the order of the [five] worlds, and not the order of the biblical passages. The description of the fourth world as the first fruit of wisdom and of the fifth as the ultimate luxury of wisdom confirms that in R. Ashers view these last two steps are the outcome of the first three stages. 86 The notions that he associates with the three cosmological worlds have their roots in Neoplatonic philosophy and correspond roughly to our understanding of a world in medieval thought. By contrast, his notions of the last two worlds have no basis in philosophy and the term world is used only very loosely, introduced only in order to fit the talmudic text. Borrowing an imaginative expression from R. Ba¹ya ben Asher, we may formulate the gist of the notion of world here by saying that R. Asher viewed the soul as going through the five worlds.
87
R. Ashers concepts are indeed fuzzy and should not be pressed too hard. The talmudic scholar accommodated some philosophical ideas, notions, and terms, but without interiorizing the philosophical-rationalist mode of argument. He used as he saw fit whatever bits and pieces he absorbed from philosophy, creating a sort of midrash that integrated new materials. Consequently, his handling of these ideas does not display the conceptual rigor we expect from trained philosophers. Now this is in keeping with what we know of R. Asher as an ambivalent student of philosophy. As mentioned briefly before, when Judah Ibn Tibbon was in the process of preparing his first translation, that of Ba¹ya Ibn Paqudahs Duties of the Hearts, he read it with (i.e., taught it to) a group of scholars including his patrons, R. Meshullam and his son R. Asher. But (as it so often happens) father and son had different preferences and agendas. From a letter that Judah Ibn Tibbon wrote to R. Asher in 1161, we know that the latter quickly became weary of Ibn Paqudahs difficult book : he complained that it was too longwinded and asked Judah Ibn Tibbon to interrupt the translation (commissioned by his father), and translate instead a shorter, more facile and more popular book, bearing on ethics, that Judah Ibn Tibbon had mentioned to him (namely Solomon Ibn Gabirols Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul).
88 Contrary to his father, the ascetic R. Asher had a very limited interest in theoretical philosophy and attached greater importance to studying the [Holy] Book [i.e., the Talmud] day and night. 89 It is therefore understandable that he did not assimilate philosophical notions in any depth, although he was among the first in Provence to recognize that knowledge derives not only from Tradition and Scripture, but also from reason. R. Asher can thus be described as an amateur of Neoplatonic philosophy in both senses of the word : he was fond of some ideas he gleaned from it and which he found useful, but he did not make its study into an important concern and did not master any of it. It is noteworthy that although R. Asher followed his father in the recognition that the Judeo-Arabic texts were valuable, he apparently The above probe into R. Ashers very partial accommodation of philosophical ideas and their re-use for his own purposes, and especially our findings concerning his vocabulary, make it quite clear, it seems to me, that the commentary on Tractate Berakhot does not betray the slightest contact with Maimonides philosophical writings (Book of Knowledge, let alone The Guide of the Perplexed). This question, upon which the dating of R. Ashers commentary hinges, has been a matter of debate. Our text was excerpted by R. Samuel b. Mordecai in a letter he wrote in the second quarter of the thirteenth century : his purpose was to prove to his correspondent (R. Yequtiel ha-Kohen) that R. Asher acknowledged the need to interpret some biblical verses allegorically, i.e., that he held the same ideas as Maimonides, although he had not seen the Masters books and it is his own thinking that led him to interpret [Scripture] rationalistically, rather than literally. 91 The reliability of this statement has been called into question by I. Ta-Shma, who discovered that a halakhic text ascribed to R. Asher contains a quotation from Maimonides Mishneh Torah : he concluded that R. Asher, having lived to see that Maimonidean work (including the philosophical Book of Knowledge), was familiar with it when he wrote his commentary on Berakhot.
92 Ta-Shmas claim seems to me unfounded, however : there is no trace of a familiarity with Maimonides philosophical ideas or vocabulary in this commentary. 93 We must conclude that the latter was written earlier than R. Ashers halakhic text containing the quotation from Maimonides. This seems perfectly plausible. It must be conceded that R. Ashers commentary on Berakhot is late, because, as we saw, it evinces familiarity with Judah Ibn Tibbons Hebrew translations, including the last of them, namely, Saadyah Gaons Beliefs and Opinions, completed in 1186. Maimonides Mishneh Torah reached the Midi in 1193, but it certainly was not available to all scholars immediately. R. Asher would thus seem to have written the commentary on Berakhot after 1186, 90 . See, e.g., Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition. The Career and Controversies of Ramah (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 43-48. 91. Idel, Sarid, 149 (see also pp. 151-152) . The crucial sentence in R. Ashers text is the one explaining that when Scripture applies the verb see to God it has the same meaning as in the verse my heart saw much wisdom and knowledge (Eccl. 1:16), both referring to knowing. The same verse from the Ecclesiastes is quoted by Maimonides, too, to argue similarly that see denotes intellectual perception (Guide 1:4). See also n. 48 above.
92. Ta-Shma, Rabbi Zera¹yah ha-Levi, pp.164-165 ; idem, Ha-Sifrut ha-parshanit la Talmud, 2:147, 149.
93. See again n. 48 above.
but before he saw the Mishneh Torah, some time after 1193. 94 Although R. Ashers intellectual career had begun by the late 1150s, there is no reason why he should not have been active some 35 or 40 years later. I conclude that R. Samuel b. Mordecai was essentially right when he wrote that R. Asher had not seen the Masters [= Maimonides] books, although we should now add the proviso when writing his commentary on Berakhot.
R. Ashers Philosophical Ideas
Finally, we may take note of the following specific points in R. Ashers belief system :
A. Cosmology and Psychology 1. R. Asher formulates a crude version of the theory of emanation : The cause of the four elements is the spheres ; the cause of the spheres is the Sphere of the Intellect (= World of Wisdom) ; the cause of the Sphere of the Intellect is the First Cause. 2. At his birth man receives powers from the stars and the spheres. 3. Mans soul is immaterial : it is a spiritual simple substance, emanated from the power of the Sphere of Intellect, identified with the Throne of Glory. This is a wise soul, through which man can know all things. 4. The spirit of beasts, by contrast, is material : it is composed of the four elements and returns to the earth after death. R. Asher is consistent in using different terms to denote the human soul [neshamah] and the spirit [nefesh] of beasts. 5. The Sphere of Intellect is therefore the divine abode of the human soul, to which it longs to return. 6. The godhead fills the entire world. Similarly, the soul fills the entire body. Mans soul and the godhead both remain pure although they are in contact with vile matter. This is so because they are not body, and filth adheres to body only. 7. Mans soul can exert itself so as to receive supernal power, which allows it to sustain the body without material nourishment. The source of this power is the World of Wisdom, i.e. the World of Intellect, the souls original abode. 8. Because man is sustained by his soul, he stands upright and can look upward, to the souls abode where it longs to return. The contrary holds of beasts, whose spirit is derived from earth, i.e. from the four elements. 9. The souls of the Just are preserved under the Sphere of Intellect, which is the Throne of Glory. B. Epistemology 1. Man was created in order to know His Creator and to worship Him. To this end he received a wise soul, which allows him to receive wisdom. His goal on earth is thus to acquire wisdom so as to know God. Even the anatomy of the female human body (with the breasts in the chest) is determined by this end. 2. Not being a body, the godhead cannot be perceived by the senses. The deity can be apprehended only by the intellect, namely through His actions, and therefore not as He truly is. 3. Applied to God, verbs such as He saw must be understood as referring not to eyesight, but, metaphorically, to intellectual perception. 4. The acquisition of knowledge is gradual, chamber within a chamber. First, man successively acquires knowledge of the three cosmological realms : the lower world of turmoil and change (of human destiny) ; the celestial world ; and the World of Intellect (= of Wisdom). Subsequently he recognizes also Gods Justice, as manifested in the fact that He judges the wicked, and finally His kindness, as manifested in the fact that the souls of the Just do not perish and are preserved eternally under the Throne of Glory. The two last steps are the fruit and the delight of wisdom. They are (maladroitly) referred to as the World of Judgment and Justice and the World of the Souls and the World of Repose. 5. Mans wise soul thus progresses to acquire knowledge of all things, lower and upper, nearby and far away, until its knowledge reaches the First Cause.
*
The classic and most influential attempt by a medieval Jewish thinker to bring together the Greco-Arabic philosophical tradition with the Jewish tradition is doubtless that of Maimonides. Ever since the publication of the Guide of the Perplexed, in the closing years of the twelfth century, readers have debated whether and to what extent it sought to philosophize Judaism. An analogous doubt cannot arise with respect to R. Asher. He belonged to the first generation of Provençal talmudists, who, while recognizing reason as a legitimate source of knowledge, completely subordinated philosophy to their exegetical needs. R. Asher used the Hebrew philosophical texts he knew as a sort of reservoir of notions, ideas and metaphors that he quarried unsystematically for hermeneutic purposes, twisting and modifying them according to the interpretive purpose at hand. In this very specific case, then, the question from which we set out, parallel to that raised by Jean Jolivet with respect to Christianity, receives an unequivocal answer : R. Asher certainly Judaized the philosophical notions that he embedded in this commentary on the Talmud.
